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The Robina Institute’s Sentencing Guidelines 
research team, led by Robina Institute Co-Director 
Professor Richard Frase (University of Minneso-
ta Law School) and Robina Institute Executive 
Director Kelly Lyn Mitchell (University of Minnesota 
Law School), has researched and published on the 
Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center original, 
in-depth jurisdiction profiles and summaries of 
important interpretive case law, providing answers 
to key questions that determine the strength and 
integrity of sentencing guidelines systems. The  
Resource Center also provides easy access to 
materials, including current versions of each juris-
diction’s guidelines, sentencing commission and 
sentencing guidelines enabling laws, and other 
important sentencing-related statutes. By bringing 
these materials together in one place and providing guidance to help visitors understand and make the 
best use of the materials, the Robina Institute seeks to facilitate the exchange and sharing of information, 
expertise, and experience; to educate on issues related to sentencing policy, guidelines, and commissions; 
to promote multi-jurisdictional comparative research and policy analysis; and to promote the adoption and 
retention of best practices in sentencing guidelines systems. 
Included in this publication are the kind of cross-jurisdictional comparisons that can now be made as the result 
of our research. Each of these comparisons can be used to discover structural variations and different practic-
es, as well as provide answers to key policy questions. 
To learn more about sentencing guidelines, visit the Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center at  
sentencing.umn.edu. The About Guidelines and Commissions section of the Sentencing Guidelines  
Resource Center includes articles that address the topics in this publication in greater detail.
The Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center
The Sentencing Guidelines Resource 
Center (SGRC) is a cutting-edge, one-
of-a-kind online resource developed 
by the Robina Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice (robinainstitute.
umn.edu) that is dedicated to providing 
insight, information, and analysis about 
sentencing guidelines systems in the 
United States. Sentencing guidelines are 
standards put in place to establish rational 
and consistent sentencing practices with 
the goal of producing more uniformity and 
proportionality in sentencing. 
sentencing.umn.edu
By Kelly Lyn Mitchell
Copyright © 2017. Regents of the University of Minnesota. All Rights Reserved.
sentencing.umn.edu
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines  
By the Numbers:
Cross-Jurisdictional Comparisons Made Easy By the  
Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center
By Kelly Lyn Mitchell
32
Source: Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Key Elements of Guidelines Systems, sentencing.umn.edu.
FIGURE 1. Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines
Source: Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Jurisdiction Profiles, Sentencing Commission Section, sentencing.umn.edu
a Oregon law requires that the commission comprise 9 members, 2 of which are non-voting and legislators, and 7 of which are appointed by the Governor.  
The law does not specify the role or representation of the gubernatorial appointees.
b At the federal level, the appointing authority (the President of the United States) has broad discretion to determine the ultimate composition of the 
commission. The only limitation is that at least three members must be federal judges and no more than four may be from the same political party. 




































































TABLE 1. Commission Membership
 Non-Guidelines  Guidelines Jurisdictions 
 Jurisdictions 
Judge(s) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  • • • • •
Defense  
Attorney • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  • •   •
Prosecutor • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  • • • • •
Dept. of  
Corrections • • • • • • •  • • • • • • •    • •   •
Legislators •  • •   • •   •  • •  • • • • • •  •
Victims/ 
Advocates • • • •  • •     • • • • • •  • •   •
Public     • •  • •  •  • • • •    •   •
Law  
Enforcement • • • •  • •  •   • • • • • •   •   •
Parole  • •  •  •  •  • •    •   • •  • •
Academics/  
Experts   • •   •  •    •   •   •    
Comm. Sup.  •       •  • •  • •        




nonvoting) 13 23 22 25 11 24 21 11 17 11 17 15 19 16 11 28 31 9 11 27 17 9 20
Commission Composition
Sentencing commissions range in size from 9 to 31 members, including non-voting or ex officio members. 
They also vary in composition as illustrated in Table 1. Nearly every commission includes members who 
are judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. A majority of commissions also have members who are 
legislators, victims or victims’ advocates, and members of the public. From there, commission mem-
bership varies a great deal, including members such as community supervision agents, juvenile justice 
practitioners and advocates, mental health experts, court administrators, county commissioners, business 
leaders, and former inmates. Only the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Virginia Sentencing Commission 
omit the defense representation that could counterbalance the prosecutorial representation on the  
commission. 
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines
Though the Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center highlights information for 26 jurisdictions, including 
the federal government, not all of these jurisdictions have sentencing guidelines (Figure 1). Neither do  
all of the jurisdictions have sentencing commissions. And over time, jurisdictions have moved back  
and forth between classifications as sentencing commissions have been formed and sunsetted and  
as guidelines systems have developed and been undercut by various factors, creating an even larger 
potential pool for study. This publication focuses on the 17 jurisdictions that exhibit the strongest char-
acteristics of sentencing guidelines: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, U.S., Utah, Virginia, Washington,  
and Washington, D.C.
Commission Purpose
Sentencing commissions are established for many different purposes. Some are established primarily for  
the purpose of developing and maintaining sentencing guidelines. Others are established with broader 
mandates relative to the state’s criminal justice system, which may or may not include the development  
of sentencing guidelines. Looking across jurisdictions, the top six purposes articulated for sentencing  
commissions in statute are:
 1. Recommend or establish sentencing policies and practices (to uphold  
  stated goals);
 2. Protect public safety;
 3. Manage correctional resources;
 4. Maintain judicial discretion in sentencing;
 5. Avoid disparity / increase equity and fairness in sentencing; and
 6. Achieve certainty in sentencing. 
Sentencing Commissions       
AK MO AL KS MN PA WA FL
CT NV AR MA NC US  TN
IL NM DE MD OH UT  
LA  DC MI OR VA  
                   Sentencing Guidelines 
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Executive AK, AR, CT, DC, DE, KS, IL, LA, MD, MN, NM, OR, UT, WA
Judicial AL, MA, MO, NC, OH, US, VA
Legislative PA, MI
TABLE 2.  Commission Placement in Government
Source: Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Jurisdictions Profiles, Sentencing Commission Section, sentencing.umn.edu.
Source: Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Jurisdiction Profiles, Sentencing Guidelines Section, sentencing.umn.edu.
a Alabama falls into two categories because it has two sets of guidelines: one set that is voluntary and subject to legislative approval, and one set that is 
presumptive and subject to legislative override.
TABLE 3. Authority to Modify the Sentencing Guidelines
 
 Method Jurisdiction
Modifications subject to legislative override  ALa MN PA  US VA
Modifications must be enacted into law   KS MI NC OH WA
Modifications subject to legislative approval  ALa OR   
Modifications are made through the    AR MD 
administrative rulemaking process    
Other or unclear   DC DE UT MA 
Authority to Modify the Sentencing Guidelines
Defining crimes and establishing punishments is a function of the legislature. But with few commissions 
residing in the legislative branch, for those commissions with responsibility for sentencing guidelines,  
the commission’s authority to modify the guidelines raises potential separation of powers issues. Thus, 
the authority of most commissions is checked by some form of legislative oversight. Looking across the 
17 guidelines jurisdictions, Table 3 sets forth these variations. In several jurisdictions, modifications must 
go through the legislative process, either because the guidelines are in statute and must be amended, or 
because legislative approval is required before the guidelines can take effect. In others, modifications are 
subject to legislative override, which generally means that the legislature must enact a law or resolution to 
prevent them from going into effect. The remaining either follow the administrative rule making process or 
a process unique to the jurisdiction.
Place in Government
Sentencing commissions can be situated in any branch of government. By far, the most common  
placement is within the Executive Branch as an independent and separate agency (Table 2). But  
successful and independent commissions exist in every branch of government. 
The Criminal History Dimension
Criminal history is more than a simple accounting of prior convictions. It is instead a composite of mul-
tiple measures of prior offending. At its core, criminal history almost always accounts for prior felonies, 
misdemeanors, and juvenile adjudications. Additionally, criminal history often includes other factors that 
are tangentially related to prior offend-
ing, such as custody status (whether the 
offender was under some type of super-
vision status such as probation when the 
offense was committed), prior probation 
violations, and prior incarcerations. From 
there, additional rules may exist that 
further enhance or lessen the value of 
the offender’s criminal history, such as 
decay or gap rules which serve to wash 
out or eliminate prior offenses from the 
criminal history if they are very old or if the 
individual achieved a crime-free existence 
for a specified number of years. All of the 
factors describe above come together to 
determine the appropriate criminal history 
score or category. 
For a detailed accounting of the compo-
nents of criminal history, read the Criminal 
History Enhancement Sourcebook, avail-




The two primary determinants of the sentence under sentencing guidelines systems are offense severity 
and criminal history.  Most systems arrange these attributes on a sentencing grid with offense severity 
representing one axis on the grid and criminal history the other.  The grid cell at the intersection of these two 
points determines the recommended sentenced under the guidelines.  Two states – Alabama and Virginia 
– do not use a grid format at all.  Instead, presumptive sentences are determined by completing worksheets 
that take into account factors reflecting both offense severity and criminal history.  Delaware utilizes a more 
narrative structure to communicate recommended sentences, and Ohio law sets forth a range of determi-
nate sentences that may be given.
Of the jurisdictions that use a grid format, three states utilize a single grid to cover all sentencing decisions: 
AR, MA, and OR. Nine jurisdictions use multiple grids so that they can differentiate the sentence ranges for  
different types of offenses.  For example, Minnesota has a grid for drug offenses, a grid for sex offenses,  
and a grid for all other offenses, and each grid is structured with slightly different rules.  Michigan has nine 
grids, each of which corresponds to one of the felony offense classifications in Michigan’s criminal code.  
Finally, Pennsylvania has grids to handle specialized issues such as sentencing enhancements and sentenc-
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Source: Sentencing Guidelines Resource Center, Jurisdiction Profiles and Case Law Summaries, sentencing.umn.edu.
a Alabama has two sets of guidelines. Only the presumptive guidelines, which would be characterized as mandatory, are featured here.
b Ohio is excluded from this table because of the uniqueness and complexity of its system.
 Jurisdiction Advisory or  W/In Guide- Appeals of Departure Departure Advisory or 
  Mandatory lines Appeal Departures Standard Reasons Mandatory
  (Self-Described) Permitted Permitted Articulated Required in Application
 Arkansas Advisory No No No Yes Advisory
 Maryland Advisory No No No Yes 
 Utah Advisory No No No Yes 
 Virginia Advisory No No No Yes 
 District of Columbia Advisory No No Yes Yes Mandatory Elements, 
 Delaware Advisory No No Yes Yes but Advisory 
 Massachusetts Advisory No No Yes Yes in Application 
 Federal Advisory Yes Yes Yes Yes   
 Michigan Advisory Yes Yes No No Leans
 Pennsylvania Advisory Yes Yes No Yes Mandatory
 Alabamaa Both No Yes Yes Yes 
 Kansas Mandatory No Yes Yes Yes 
 Minnesota Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 North Carolina Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes Mandatory
 Oregon Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Washington Mandatory Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TABLE 5. Placing Jurisdictions on the Advisory to Mandatory Continuum Based on  
Appeal and Departure Standards
Operating on the Advisory to Mandatory Continuum
An important characteristic of sentencing guidelines is whether they are considered advisory or manda-
tory. The term “advisory” connotes that the guidelines are a starting point or suggestion for sentencing 
while the term “mandatory” connotes that the sentences established by the guidelines are required. In 
truth, no system is fully advisory or mandatory. Though just 5-1/2 jurisdictions would classify themselves 
as mandatory (with one of Alabama’s two sets of guidelines constituting the 1/2), all guidelines systems 
exist on a continuum of enforceability, and some jurisdictions that label their guidelines advisory are in 
application further along the continuum towards the mandatory end. 
Departures and appeals are two key factors that impact the advisory or mandatory nature of the guide-
lines. Looking at these attributes together, one can see a relationship that underlies the more mandatory 
systems (Table 5). All of the jurisdictions that would label themselves as mandatory permit appeals of 
departure sentences, and all articulate a departure standard thereby establishing a parameter to govern 
the appeal (e.g., whether the court’s reason for the departure was substantial and compelling). These are 
the jurisdictions that are firmly on the mandatory end of the continuum because the guidelines must be 
followed unless the court meets a specified standard for departure, and even then, appeal is permitted, 
thereby creating a mechanism to enforce the use of the guidelines. The Federal system, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania, which would all self-identify as advisory, lean more towards the mandatory end of the 
continuum by requiring that the guidelines be considered as the starting point for sentencing and by 
permitting appeal based upon errors in application of the guidelines and departure sentences. Moreover 
case law has developed to fill in the lack of a departure standard in Pennsylvania, and case law  
is developing in the newly advisory Federal and Michigan systems. But here, jurisdictions like the District 
of Columbia, Delaware, and Massachusetts stand out because although they articulate a standard for  
departure, with no right of appeal to enforce that standard, the requirement is somewhat meaningless. 
The remaining jurisdictions are firmly on the advisory end of the system, relying only on the potential for 
peer pressure to enforce the application of the guidelines.
Departures
A departure is a sentence other than that recommended in the sentencing guidelines. Every state guide-
lines system permits judges to pronounce sentences that are harsher than (aggravated) or less severe 
than (mitigated) the recommended guidelines sentences. But while some systems place no limits on 
these actions, others place greater restraint on the exercise of judicial discretion. One measure of restraint 
on judicial discretion is to require that a specific standard be met in order for the court to pronounce a 
departure sentence. Six jurisdictions do not articulate such a standard, and the remaining jurisdictions 
require either that there be substantial and compelling circumstances or that the court making findings 
about mitigating or aggravating facts (Table 5). A second measure of restraint is to require, or at least 
request, the court to state on the record or in writing its reasons for sentencing outside of the guidelines. 
Here, every jurisdiction except Michigan imposes such a requirement, and Michigan only differs because 
the statute originally containing this requirement was struck when the Michigan Supreme Court rendered 
the guidelines advisory in a Booker-type fix. 
Appeals
Another factor that impacts the strength of sentencing guidelines within a system is whether the parties 
can appeal guidelines and non-guidelines sentences. Appeals of sentences that are within the scope of 
the guidelines serve as a check on the court’s accuracy in applying the guidelines, and ensure that there 
are common understandings and interpretations of the various sentencing guidelines provisions. Appeals 
of sentences that are outside of the guidelines allow the appellate courts to establish the outer boundar-
ies of the trial court’s discretion by accepting or rejecting departure reasons and by considering whether 
limits should be placed on the extent of the departure sentence. Seven jurisdictions permit appellate 
review of sentences that are within the recommended guidelines range, primarily for error correction 
purposes, while nine permit review of departure sentences (Table 5). 
Parole Release Discretion
One might assume that a shift to sentencing guidelines also requires a shift to deter-
minate sentencing (a fixed term rather than a range) and abolishment of parole as a 
release mechanism. But in fact, seven jurisdictions have retained parole release dis-
cretion: Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Utah. In these states, the guidelines are generally utilized to established one end of 
the sentencing range – either the minimum time to serve or the maximum sentence 
– and the parole board determines the actual release date within that range. The 
guidelines are used to set the minimum term in Michigan and Pennsylvania and the 
maximum term in Alabama, Arkansas, and Massachusetts. The guidelines set both 
ends of the range in Maryland. And in Utah, the guidelines are merely a guide to the 
parole board as to the typical time served. It is interesting to note that in nearly all of 
these jurisdictions, the guidelines are considered to be advisory, which may indi-
cate that the retention of parole may have been related to the political climate  
in which the guidelines were constructed and enacted. 
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About the Robina Institute of Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice
The Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice is located at the University of Minnesota 
Law School. The Robina Institute engages in original, interdisciplinary research that examines critical 
issues in the field of criminal justice. The Institute works to achieve transformative change in sentencing 
law and policy and correctional policies and practices. By partnering with state and local jurisdictions, 
the Institute focuses nationally on sentencing guidelines systems, parole release and revocation, and 
community supervision, as well as locally on the Minnesota criminal justice system. 
The Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice was established in 2011 at the University of 
Minnesota Law School thanks to a generous gift from the Robina Foundation. Created by James H. 
Binger (’41), the Robina Foundation provides funding to major institutions that generate transformative 
ideas and promising approaches to addressing critical social issues.
For more information, visit robinainstitute.umn.edu.
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